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This paper seeks to analyze the information ratio differences between long/short hedge funds over the past 
two decades using the Treynor-Black model. The Treynor-Black model is a method to derive an optimal 
portfolio allocation across safe and risky assets, based off of expected alphas of active investments and the 
unsystematic volatility that can be attributed to each given security. We first developed and implemented a 
model to forecast information ratios on a database of long/short hedge funds. With the predicted information 
ratios, we calculated out-of-sample allocation weights from a Treynor-Black active portfolio model. These 
weights were then tested in a long/short format against a Naive model that invests equally in all hedge funds. 
By subtracting the Naive weights from the Treynor-Black weight recommendations, we were able to test the 
efficacy of the Treynor-Black model under performance-neutral circumstances. 
 
We found that the Treynor-Black model outperforms in a market that is trending upwards, such as 2017. In 
a market with a correction, as seen in December 2018, the Treynor-Black model performs in-line with the 
Naive, generating minimum excess return but taking on no additional risk. Following a market correction 
into another upwards market (seen in 2019), the Treynor-Black model is not nearly as effective. Due to the 
importance of the previous year's information ratio, the recommended allocations expected a continuation of 
market risk and overcorrected. We conclude that information ratio predictions combined with the Treynor-
Black model can help generate alpha in a bull market, while taking on average downside risk in a turbulent 
market, instead of undue downside exposure as seen in some funds. 
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Introduction 
Hedge fund assets comprise trillions worldwide and they are a longstanding and 
important part of the finance world. They serve as investment vehicles for institutional and 
accredited investors, using a variety of generally high risk-high reward strategies through 
different asset classes and investments. Hedge funds can invest using options, derivatives, 
short-selling, and more, or can choose to do just long/short equity investing. With so many 
options, and so many hedge funds, asset managers around the world face the simple 
question: which fund should manage their capital? 
In this paper, we seek to provide clarity on a corner of the market, studying 
long/short hedge funds over the past two decades through the lens of information ratios 
and the Treynor-Black model. Long/short funds are structured identical to other hedge 
funds but are mandated to invest only long or short as their investment strategy. This means 
that they are restricted to two methods of generating gains: buy and hold equity or sell it 
short. Many hedge funds employ unconventional strategies through derivatives that may 
not yield themselves well to an analysis of their respective information advantages, and 
therefore they will be excluded from our research. 
Long-short hedge funds choose investments by their risk-reward ratios. Essentially, 
they look at their expected return from a particular investment and compare it to the risk 
they would be taking on by investing in, or shorting, the stock. Both parts of this analysis 
are key – a fund can generate strong returns by taking on a disproportionate amount of risk, 
but exposes itself to potentially losing everything, and a fund can have low return with very 
low risk, providing a secure place to allocate capital but losing potential gains. In finance, 
this principle has led to the rise of a number of different methods meant to quantify the 
relationship between risk and reward. 
One such measure, known as the information ratio or appraisal ratio, quantifies 
excess portfolio returns beyond a benchmark, alongside the consistency of those returns. 
A high information ratio indicates strong risk-adjusted returns, and a low information ratio 
means that the return may not be able to justify the risk. The information ratio is a common 
performance measure, and can be used to understand the skill of a hedge fund manager in 
security selection. As it is a measure of skill and performance, understanding the 
information ratio and applying it to a selection of hedge funds could result in an improved 
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allocation capital for investors. Information ratios, considering their relationship to 
performance, could potentially be used to forecast hedge fund returns and more. 
In this paper, we look to answer four key questions. First, can information ratios 
actually be used to forecast hedge fund returns? Second, in an out-of-sample test, are those 
predicted returns accurate? Third, is it possible to use predicted information ratios through 
the Treynor-Black model to create a fund-of-funds investment portfolio? And fourth, does 
the Treynor-Black model allocation improve selection of an investment portfolio when 
compared to a naïve equal-weight model? 
To answer these questions, this paper will follow four steps, each of which builds 
on the last. First, we will develop a model to forecast information ratios, delving into what 
the ratio represents and what factors drive it. Second, we will implement the forecasting 
model on a set of long/short hedge funds and predict forward information ratios. Third, we 
will use our predicted information ratios to implement the Treynor-Black active portfolio 
model and generate recommended hedge fund weights. Fourth, we will test the Treynor-
Black portfolio versus a naïve, equal weight portfolio. This will be through a simulated 
long-Treynor-Black and short-naïve model, conducted out-of-sample over three years. 
Lastly, we will discuss the implications of our results, and interesting things to note. 
Literature Review 
Prior Hedge Fund Literature 
Since the 1990s, the hedge fund industry has grown in importance as an investment 
vehicle for pension funds, accredited investors, and other institutions. However, standard 
estimates of the hedge fund industry belie its true importance and performance. In 2016, 
where estimated worldwide hedge funds assets under management ranged from $2.3-3.7 
trillion, true underlying assets were estimated and found to be above $5 trillion (Barth, 
Joenvaara, Kauppila, and Wermers, 2021), and their importance to financial markets is 
understated by standard estimates. Barth et al. then went on to describe that public-
reporting funds have significantly lower returns than funds that do not report, which is 
likely due to an alpha differential rather than systematic risk exposure. In our research, this 
indicates that the likely broader performance of hedge funds will be understated as we rely 
on a public, self-reporting database. 
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Adding to the discussion on performance, Fung and Hsieh (2021) analyzed style 
classifications and found that funds’ performance ‘decays’ over time, with “less than 20% 
of long/short equity hedge funds delivering significant, persistent, stable positive non-
factor related returns.” There was no fund size effect in the data, but they did find that 
long/short hedge funds generally have factor-independent returns in contrast to classic 
long-only or long-biased hedge funds. In this paper, we will be analyzing long/short funds, 
and this research establishes two questions to consider. First, does performance (in terms 
of information ratios) persist? And second, are long/short funds generally factor-
independent, or do they have systematic exposure? 
 Baquero, ter Horst, and Verbeek (2005) analyzed hedge fund sampling issues, 
drawing some key conclusions on performance, persistence, and survival. The assumption 
behind the relationship between performance, persistence, and survival is simply this: 
investors take past performance as an indicator of future performance. However, sustained 
outperformance is rare and difficult to maintain, and the opposite side of the coin - 
sustained underperformance - leads to funds being dissolved and assets returned to 
investors. Therefore, there are some major risks raised with hedge fund data. A high 
attrition rate, where funds with poor performance are dissolved, leads to some sampling 
bias. Self-selection contributes to the same, where funds refuse to report to public databases 
depending on their performance in the given time period. Correspondingly, funds with 
good performance are both more likely to report and continue to exist, which potentially 
skews public database information on hedge fund performance. 
Though Baquero, ter Horst, and Verbeek (2005) discuss fund performance and risks 
for US-based funds from 1994 to 2000, the broader implications of their research must be 
considered. They found performance persistence to exist on a quarterly level more so than 
an annual level, with annual level persistence not being statistically significant. Strong 
hedge fund manager performance therefore is an indicator of future performance on a 
shorter-term basis. With this research in mind, we opted for a model that incorporates a 
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Measuring Hedge Fund Performance with the Information Ratio 
A common measure of hedge fund manager performance is known as the 
Information Ratio, summarized by Sharpe as a more general form of the Sharpe Ratio. The 
ratio was widely used when Thomas Goodwin summarized its calculation and implications 
in “The Information Ratio” (1998) and is still relevant today. As a calculation, the 
Information Ratio is simply the average excess return of the portfolio versus a relevant 
benchmark, divided by the volatility of the excess return. As such, it’s a standard 
representation of reward to risk, and is an excellent way to understand the return a hedge 
fund manager can generate, along with the risk taken on for that return. High performance 
with higher volatility can indicate a poor manager, but the same return with low volatility 
is a potential hallmark of skill. 
 
First, you define excess return as the return of the portfolio: 
 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 
 







This information ratio, originally known as the appraisal ratio, is derived from 
Fischer Black and Jack Treynor’s seminal paper, “How to Use Security Analysis to 
Improve Portfolio Selection” (1973) wherein they lay out a model for portfolio allocation. 
The Treynor-Black model relies on treating funds as a three-part portfolio. First, there are 
riskless assets - today, generalized to be US Treasury Bills. Second, there is a highly 
diversified portfolio, which captures market exposure with minimal specific risk to the 
underlying equities. Third, there is the true active portfolio, comprised of both security 
specific risk and market risk. 
Though the Treynor-Black model focuses on specific weight calculations between 
risky and risk-free assets, they also explain an appraisal ratio-weighted calculation for the 
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internal active portfolio. That calculation for an optimal fund-weighting is used extensively 
as the basis of this thesis. Each investment in the Treynor-Black model is to be weighted 
according to its expected return (alpha) and its risk exposure. Risk exposure here is security 
specific; even with diversification, it is impossible to rid a portfolio of market-wide risks, 
though it can be minimized through the risky asset vs. risk-free asset weightings. Black 
and Treynor additionally lay out an additional clarification on their ideal active portfolio. 
As security mispricing on the average would mean half are above their true value, and half 
below, the ideal portfolio would have equal long/short weight. As later discussed, we use 
this assumption to test a long/short portfolio and measure if Treynor-Black allocation can 
help generate excess returns in a fund of funds allocation. 
Data Overview 
Key Factors 
The data used for this project was collected from a number of different sources, 
including both quantitative fund metrics and return history, along with specific hedge fund 
characteristics. 
Performance Data To estimate hedge fund ‘performance,’ we relied on annual and 
monthly returns in percentage points, as reported by Morningstar’s Global Hedge Fund 
Database (2021). Morningstar’s data was organized as panel data, with multiple funds over 
an extended period of time. Post-2000, the data was well-populated with a variety of funds 
and strategies reported every year. Each of the hedge funds in the data persists until it stops 
reporting or no longer exists, and no funds persist for the entirety of the data period. Though 
believed to be accurate, this data is self-reported and is therefore potentially exposed to 
survivorship or performance bias, where funds that did well or perhaps had some sort of 
advantage over the market are more likely to exist in the data for an extended period of 
time. Funds with poorer performance may choose to stop reporting to the database or may 
simply stop existing. Funds that value privacy for the sake of performance, generally with 
higher returns, may choose not to make their returns available to such a database, which 
could result in the hedge fund return universe from Morningstar deviating significantly 
from the true return scope and scale of hedge funds. Additional information that was not 
available from the Morningstar database was respective capital gains taxes on hedge funds 
– funds with short-term investments and more turnover would be subject to higher one-
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year tax rates, when compared to long-term capital gains taxes for investments held for an 
extended period of time. 
Fund Metrics Fund metrics, also sourced from the same Morningstar hedge fund database, 
are any pieces of information specific to the funds within the performance sample that 
could add additional clarity or restrictions to my analysis. The primary data we relied on 
here was fund size, fee structure, domicile, currency denomination, and strategy 
(long/short). Using the reported fund data, we converted non-numerical values into a 
useable format for our regressions, and also created modified variables for regression 
specifications. 
Benchmark Performance Another piece of data essential for this project is the market 
return per month for the time period analyzed, obtained from Yahoo Finance (2021). The 
market return, in this case the S&P 500, will function as the benchmark for hedge funds. 
This is the most representative index available for US-based long/short hedge funds. There 
was also general Factor benchmark performance used to calculate the fund information 
ratios, sourced from Kenneth French’s Data Library (2020). 
Risk Premia and Risk-Free Rates The last piece of data needed is the associated equity 
risk premiums per month for each investment historically, along with the US risk-free rate 
for the same time period. This data was obtained from Aswath Damodaran (2021), an NYU 
professor who calculates standardized metrics every month. The market ascribes a certain 
necessary return for stocks in excess of the risk-free rate, and this particular risk-reward 
ratio will help contrast and benchmark hedge fund risk allocation versus the risk allocation 
of the benchmark, the S&P 500. 
 
Data Cleaning Process 
Before analyzing the data, we cleaned the data so that it accurately represented and 
sampled our target set hedge funds. In this step, we also dealt with potential outliers and 
modified the data to minimize bias. 
First, from the total hedge fund database, we restricted the funds to be used by 
category. For the purposes of the long/short comparison that we will be building, and 
because conventional long/short portfolios work better with benchmark comparisons than 
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alternative hedge fund strategies, we ended with seven classifications of long/short funds, 
by region, size, or by market. 
Then, we restricted potential fund outliers. Based on monthly performance, we 
eliminated data points where monthly return for a particular fund exceeded 100%. 
Although such return is possible, it is rare and liable to skew the data. There were only 7 
observations in the entire data set where return exceeded 100%. 
After eliminating outliers, we removed funds with insufficient data for analysis. 
Funds that did not have yearly returns available were dropped, as well as funds that did not 
have complete monthly returns. This is simply a method to make sure the data has no major 
gaps that would make forecasting inaccurate. 
Finally, to minimize reporting and survivorship bias, we dropped the first and last 
reporting years for funds. In self-reporting databases, hedge funds are potentially more 
likely to begin reporting in months/years where they have generated abnormally high 
returns. Similarly, funds with abnormally low returns are liable to stop reporting or go out 
of business, so the last reporting year would also be inaccurate for our model. 
Table 1, below, indicates the number of observations remaining per hedge fund 
strategy after the data restrictions imposed above. 
Table 1: Hedge Fund Categories 
Hedge Fund Category Observations 
Asia/Pacific Long/Short Equity 3,264 
China Long/Short Equity 26,004 
Emerging Markets Long/Short Equity 8,628 
Europe Long/Short Equity 10,404 
Global Long/Short Equity 10,452 
U.S. Long/Short Equity 23,088 
U.S. Small Cap Long/Short Equity 7,428 
 
Generating Variables 
With cleaned and organized hedge fund data, the next step was to generate any 
variables potentially useful for regression models, testing, or just for understanding the data 
itself. 
Using monthlynetassets, a month-by-month measure of underlying assets at hedge 
funds, we conducted a yearly average to come up with an annual average asset value per 
fund that reported, defined as averageassets. To minimize the lookahead bias likely from 
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a straight average, we also used monthlynetassets and trimmed the data to get an end-of-
year asset value simply called assets. We opted to use December values, filling in with 
November and October values where missing so that our data from this metric would best 
represent the fourth-quarter hedge fund asset value. For both averageassets and assets, we 
added natural log versions that may be useful in regression specification. We then 
generated a firmassets variable that would account for firm-size, as funds under a single 
firm may follow a fundamentally similar strategy or be comparatively smaller than other 
hedge funds. Using monthlynetassets, we then created assetproportion, a variable that 
measured the proportion of firm assets that the fund consisted of, and the natural log of the 
firmassets. 
We also created three variables to specifically address the managers of the hedge 
funds at hand. Considering that we will be using the information ratio in this project, which 
is also known as a measure of security selection and allocation skill, these metrics are key. 
Morningstar reported both the average manager tenure by fund, and the longest manager 
tenure by fund. Both of these could independently measure the experience of managers, so 
we created avgmanagertenure and longestmanagertenure, but an understanding of the two 
yielded some new information. In cases where the average manager tenure is lower than 
the longest manager tenure, the fund has been subject to a change in management. With 
this principle, we created managerturnoverbinary, where manager turnover can be 
accounted for. 
Then, using Morningstar data, we created a number of fund fee-structure metrics. 
Feesbool was true if management charged above the standard hedge fund rate (2% 
management, 20% performance), as a measure of management’s opinion on the worth of 
their fund. Feesrange functioned similarly but accounted for deviations both upwards and 
downwards in fund fees. If a fund charged above 2.25% management or below 1.75% 
management, the variable would return True. The same applies on performance fees above 
22.5% and below 17.5%. Another variable, feesaltstruc, aggregated and accounted for 
other fund incentive and operation metrics that were difficult to isolate alone. A firm with 
high watermarks, clawbacks, or a deferred load emphasis would be marked by the binary 
variable, and if this sort of emphasis has any impact on the information ratio, the variable 
would account for it. 
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For further analysis, we isolated positive and negative returns from our dataset. By 
fund and year, we created posreturns and negreturns, which contained the return of the 
fund on an annual basis if the return was positive or negative, respectively. If not, the 
variable would simply be zero. This isolation of upward and downward allows us to 
understand the importance of upwards and downwards shifts in the information ratio. For 
example – does high outperformance (positive returns) indicate a continuing trend, or will 
it be significant with a negative coefficient when we conduct our regression? It could also 
be that only one of the two is significant in predicting information ratios, meaning that 
moves in one direction matter a lot more as a trend for the future. Creating these new 
variables helps us better understand this relationship. 
 
Final Data Summary Statistics 
Below are data summaries for the variables described in the previous section. 
Table 2: Yearly Returns, by year 







2001 876 12.53 20.57 -9.71 40.41 
2002 960 1.87 19.89 -21.42 26.27 
2003 1,176 38.36 28.91 6.72 74.41 
2004 1,428 17.81 15.79 3.29 34.68 
2005 1,788 14.69 15.67 -2.72 35.89 
2006 2,124 22.64 22.12 5.24 45.37 
2007 2,580 24.51 31.29 -3.73 63.32 
2008 2,928 -26.96 24.51 -58.63 -0.03 
2009 3,360 46.31 43.17 10.39 89.835 
2010 3,960 15.08 18.08 -0.945 32.51 
2011 4,740 -6.26 12.53 -21.98 6.49 
2012 5,964 12.27 15.18 -1.36 27.69 
2013 7,188 21.22 17.55 2.16 43.24 
2014 7,644 13.79 23.11 -8.31 50.08 
2015 8,484 11.47 26.72 -15.69 45.22 
2016 9,396 -3.36 19.78 -25.01 17.07 
2017 9,768 21.46 20.27 1.61 43.41 
2018 8,592 -12.46 17.45 -31.58 7.30 
2019 6,312 17.90 18.30 0.09 40.93 
Total 89,268 10.53 26.53 -18.51 39.54 
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Table 3: Monthly Returns, by year 







2001 876 1.02 5.82 -5.2 7.6 
2002 960 0.14 5.21 -5.545 5.69 
2003 1,176 2.66 4.14 -1.53 7.82 
2004 1,428 1.38 3.79 -2.58 6.09 
2005 1,788 1.16 4.04 -3.44 5.68 
2006 2,124 1.68 4.10 -2.73 6.40 
2007 2,580 1.73 4.48 -3.03 6.81 
2008 2,928 -2.74 8.36 -12.54 5.39 
2009 3,360 3.15 7.01 -3.57 11.06 
2010 3,960 1.23 5.52 -4.885 7.43 
2011 4,740 -0.46 5.59 -6.75 4.96 
2012 5,964 1.01 4.75 -4.01 5.83 
2013 7,188 1.63 4.60 -3.18 6.65 
2014 7,644 1.03 4.75 -3.87 6.34 
2015 8,484 0.98 7.70 -7.09 10.49 
2016 9,396 -0.25 5.98 -5.53 5.20 
2017 9,768 1.60 4.05 -2.21 5.68 
2018 8,592 -1.12 5.24 -7.33 4.46 
2019 6,312 1.43 5.47 -4.00 7.06 
Total 89,268 0.76 5.66 -4.98 6.47 
 
Table 4: Monthly Net Assets, by year* 







2001 583 74.5 86.3 5.24 203 
2002 691 93.2 122 6.60 220 
2003 816 112 140 6.00 305 
2004 981 145 194 8.57 424 
2005 1,129 174 229 7.70 488 
2006 1,341 219 306 10.50 622 
2007 1,534 408 1440 12.50 686 
2008 1,887 287 866 10.00 519 
2009 1,990 172 484 6.73 348 
2010 2,368 129 242 8.0 340 
2011 2,390 134 260 6.26 361 
2012 2,383 154 295 5.69 441 
2013 2,474 168 316 7.43 446 
2014 2,604 178 334 9.20 428 
2015 2,626 183 339 6.500 485 
2016 2,128 190 353 4.75 600 
2017 1,987 196 462 2.00 480 
2018 2,167 215 619 1.08 496 
2019 1,955 260 864 1.77 519 
Total 34,034 190 537 5.76 444 
*This is reported in millions for Mean, Standard Deviation, 10th Percentile, and 90th Percentile  
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Table 5: Variable Summary Statistics 
Summary 









77,664 15.44 6.30 8.50 24.25 
avgmanager 
tenure 
77,664 14.79 5.74 8.50 23.42 
mgmtfee 84,408 1.48 0.42 1.00 2.00 
maxmgmtfee 21,948 1.40 0.54 1.00 2.00 
performancefee 79,176 18.98 3.68 15.0 20.00 
average_assets 89,268 192** 54.3** 134** 260** 
ln_avgassets 89,268 19.03 0.26 18.71 19.38 
assets 8,451 194** 540** 6.03** 451** 
ln_assets 8,449 17.76 1.79 15.61 19.94 
ln_avgtenure 77,664 2.59 0.58 2.14 3.15 
ln_longesttenure 77,664 2.62 0.60 2.14 3.19 
feesbool 89,268 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 
feesrange 89,268 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 
feesaltstruc 89,268 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 
firmassets 89,268 72.4** 344** 0.00 151** 
ln_firmassets 34,062 17.73 1.79 15.56 19.91 
assetproportion 34,021 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
posreturns 7,439 15.38 21.19 0.00 39.54 
negreturns 7,439 -4.85 10.30 -18.51 0.00 
**The marked values are reported in millions 
 
Regression Models and Empirical Analysis 
With cleaned data and variables generated, we can begin the analysis necessary to 
answer the core questions of this research paper. 
1. Build a model to forecast information ratios, 
2. Implement the forecasting model and predict information ratios, 
3. Use the Treynor-Black active portfolio model to generate recommended weights, 
and, 
4. Test the Treynor-Black active portfolio against a naïve model in a long/short 
analysis. 
After completing these steps, we will summarize our results and compare between the 
different time periods tested. 
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Building an Information Ratio Forecasting Model 
To forecast a hedge fund’s information ratio, there are a few steps to follow. First, 
we will identify return benchmarks (regional market indices that act as the ‘universe’ for 
the hedge funds). Second, using those benchmarks in a factor model, we will compute the 
beta, or sensitivity, of hedge fund returns to the benchmark using a regression. Third, using 
beta and regression residuals, we will calculate the information ratio. Fourth, we will 
discuss the calculated information ratios and potential drivers for our forecasting model. 
 
Identifying Benchmarks 
 We will be using a set of three factors for each category of fund. Funds are generally 
separated by their region, though there is a set of emerging markets funds and U.S. smallcap 
funds. Our method for selecting was regional, and all fund categories were also measured 
against the international benchmark. The data had significant variability in domicile for the 
hedge funds. However, Morningstar reported fund-specific strategies shown in the 
category section of the table below. With this in mind, we selected factor benchmarks 
carefully based on geography and primary target investment universe. For example, China 
Long/Short Equity is best described by the China benchmark. However, China, as a part of 
the Asia/Pacific, may also be driven in part by that benchmark. The specific factor 
benchmarks used are summarized in the chart below. 
Table 6: Hedge Fund Factor Overview 








Japan Japan International 




Markets International - 
Europe Long/Short Equity Europe International - 
Global Long/Short Equity International U.S. Developed ex-US 
U.S. Long/Short Equity U.S. North America International 
U.S. Small Cap Long/Short 
Equity U.S. North America International 
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Creating a Factor Model 
After we identified the regional benchmarks, we ran a regression on each fund-year 
to analyze the coefficients and residuals so that we could calculate information ratios for 
each fund. 
 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹1 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹2 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹3 
 
Below, in Tables 7-9, the results of the above regression are reported. 2018, with a 
December market correction, had significantly lower returns than other years, with losses 
particularly concentrated in China. 
Table 7: Hedge Fund Factor Summary, 2017 







Asia/Pacific Long/Short Equity 25.58 -0.10 -0.01 0.05 
China Long/Short Equity 24.05 0.12 0.31 -0.54 
Emerging Markets Long/Short Equity 25.00 -0.06 0.11 0.00 
Europe Long/Short Equity 15.41 0.00 -0.08 0.00 
Global Long/Short Equity 21.65 1.81 -1.07 -0.82 
U.S. Long/Short Equity 18.30 -1.36 1.52 -0.20 
U.S. Small Cap Long/Short Equity 14.35 -5.15 5.96 -0.71 
 
Table 8: Hedge Fund Factor Summary, 2018 







Asia/Pacific Long/Short Equity -13.79 0.30 -0.13 0.70 
China Long/Short Equity -23.44 0.17 0.42 2.70 
Emerging Markets Long/Short Equity -12.85 0.15 2.35 0.00 
Europe Long/Short Equity -1.35 0.51 0.08 0.00 
Global Long/Short Equity -7.63 8.19 -4.68 -2.94 
U.S. Long/Short Equity -5.22 -3.34 2.01 1.58 
U.S. Small Cap Long/Short Equity -4.52 -0.33 -1.20 1.86 
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Table 9: Hedge Fund Factor Summary, 2019 







Asia/Pacific Long/Short Equity 9.42 0.04 0.04 -0.22 
China Long/Short Equity 27.35 0.10 0.09 -0.48 
Emerging Markets Long/Short Equity 15.77 0.44 -0.45 0.00 
Europe Long/Short Equity 9.48 0.57 -0.74 0.00 
Global Long/Short Equity 12.54 6.26 -3.67 -2.64 
U.S. Long/Short Equity 20.51 12.56 -15.41 3.22 
U.S. Small Cap Long/Short Equity 15.83 13.01 -15.52 2.73 
 
Calculating the Information Ratio 
With the above regression equation, we calculated the information ratio by dividing 
the beta constant by the variance of the residuals. Tables 10-12 summarize the calculated 
information ratios by year, and the R2 values by year and by category. Our regression for 
calculating information ratios had an R2 value on average of 24% and ranged from 0% to 
91%. It appears that the coefficient of determination for this regression varied heavily by 
fund but was on average towards the lower end of the spectrum. 
Table 10: Information Ratios, by year 







2001 876 0.24 1.21 -0.11 0.32 
2002 960 0.06 0.48 -0.19 0.32 
2003 1,176 0.48 0.61 0.12 1.05 
2004 1,428 0.34 0.40 0.03 0.79 
2005 1,788 0.31 1.30 -0.03 0.40 
2006 2,124 0.36 0.45 0.05 0.81 
2007 2,580 0.25 0.38 -0.01 0.56 
2008 2,928 -0.08 0.11 -0.21 0.01 
2009 3,360 0.27 0.30 0.05 0.61 
2010 3,960 0.13 0.32 -0.05 0.40 
2011 4,740 0.00 0.22 -0.16 0.11 
2012 5,964 0.16 0.25 0.00 0.41 
2013 7,188 0.27 0.35 0.02 0.64 
2014 7,644 0.21 0.43 -0.08 0.58 
2015 8,484 0.08 0.29 -0.11 0.30 
2016 9,396 -0.01 0.20 -0.17 0.20 
2017 9,768 0.54 2.47 0.02 1.08 
2018 8,592 -0.13 3.64 -0.63 0.11 
2019 6,312 0.34 2.85 -0.01 0.45 
Total 89,268 0.18 1.64 -0.16 0.50 
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Table 11: Information Ratio R2, by year 







2001 876 0.24 0.14 0.06 0.38 
2002 960 0.20 0.13 0.06 0.42 
2003 1,176 0.20 0.15 0.03 0.40 
2004 1,428 0.31 0.17 0.08 0.56 
2005 1,788 0.26 0.16 0.07 0.45 
2006 2,124 0.37 0.19 0.13 0.67 
2007 2,580 0.17 0.14 0.03 0.35 
2008 2,928 0.26 0.17 0.06 0.51 
2009 3,360 0.28 0.17 0.05 0.52 
2010 3,960 0.27 0.20 0.03 0.53 
2011 4,740 0.18 0.15 0.02 0.39 
2012 5,964 0.19 0.16 0.02 0.42 
2013 7,188 0.23 0.16 0.04 0.43 
2014 7,644 0.26 0.22 0.03 0.59 
2015 8,484 0.24 0.18 0.06 0.52 
2016 9,396 0.23 0.14 0.05 0.41 
2017 9,768 0.22 0.15 0.05 0.44 
2018 8,592 0.26 0.15 0.07 0.46 
2019 6,312 0.33 0.18 0.11 0.59 
Total 89,268 0.24 0.17 0.05 0.49 
 
Table 12: Information Ratio R2, by Category 








Long/Short Equity 3,264 0.26 0.17 0.07 0.49 
China Long/Short 
Equity 26,004 0.23 0.15 0.06 0.43 
Emerging Markets 
Long/Short Equity 8,628 0.20 0.17 0.02 0.45 
Europe Long/Short 
Equity 10,404 0.16 0.15 0.01 0.36 
Global Long/Short 
Equity 10,452 0.28 0.19 0.07 0.55 
U.S. Long/Short 
Equity 23,088 0.29 0.18 0.06 0.55 
U.S. Small Cap 
Long/Short Equity 7,428 0.28 0.18 0.07 0.52 
Total 89,268 0.24 0.17 0.05 0.49 
 
P a g e  | 16 
We noted an interesting and steady higher information ratio early in the sample, 
from 2003 to 2007, which ended with the financial crisis. The R2 values over the same time 
period were correspondingly higher, and neither of these metrics have wholly recovered 
since the financial crisis. Looking at R2 by category, it is generally higher for global and 
U.S. long/short funds. Even small-cap focused hedge funds in the U.S. generated an on-
average information ratio well above their peers from different locales. Europe was an 
outlier in the data set, having an economically lower average information ratio. 
From the information ratios, it appears that some funds take on more systematic 
risks than others. This risk could be because of their trading/investing strategies, with hedge 
funds choosing to take on risk in a non-standard long/short manner. Another potential issue 
is misclassification by Morningstar for hedge funds, which would mean the misclassified 
fund’s information ratio is unlikely to be accurately calculated. The benchmark choices for 
this analysis were made carefully, but funds that invest in globally in reality, but only a 
specific geography by their category, may also have differing information ratios from what 
we calculated above. 
 
Discussing a Potential Information Ratio Forecasting Model 
To build an information ratio forecasting model, we decided to use some time-
variate drivers and year fixed effects. Due to the difficulty in obtaining absolute, complete 
data, we were unable to include more granular fund information. The sample information 
ratio regression included the following variables: infratio, ln_assets, assetproportion, 
posreturns, and negreturns. With these, we could isolate three key drivers of the next year’s 
information ratio. 
First, the last year’s information ratio (infratio) is a potential driver of next year’s 
information ratio. A hedge fund manager does not lose their skill in security selection 
overnight, and strong investing choices made in a single year can benefit the hedge fund 
for years to come. Conversely, poor selections in a single year can handicap performance 
for years to come. Both of these situations depend on the information ratio, or skill, of the 
previous year. 
Second, the underlying assets of a fund (ln_assets, assetproportion) can lead to a 
large differential between returns, depending on their capital controls. Outflows can 
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decimate funds if they occur at the wrong time, and large inflows following a strong year 
can force managers to allocated capital to less-certain ventures. These dynamics 
characterize a strong relationship between assets and returns. 
Third, the hedge fund returns from the previous year, divided by up and down 
moves into posreturns and negreturns, respectively, are also a key driver of performance. 
As mentioned with assets, strong performance can drive inflows that drive down 
performance in later periods. Certain funds may have differing relationships between 
performance in one year and the next and isolating the impact of upwards and downwards 
moves can help us identify which trend has a greater impact on the information ratio of the 
next year. Lastly, we included year fixed effects so that we could isolate the impact of the 
year to hedge fund returns. 
 
Implementing the Forecasting Model and Predicting Information Ratios 
Now that we have our calculated information ratios historically and have discussed 
potential drivers of an information ratio regression, the next step is to test them. In order to 
do this, we will first run regressions from 2001 to 2017, 2018, and 2019. Then, we will 
conduct and out-of-sample prediction test, using the same three years for comparison: 
2017, 2018, and 2019. Our regression specifications did not change with the years, besides 
the addition of the binary year effect variables. The formulas below summarize the 
regression outputs, and the three tables following show the statistical significance of 
various coefficients. 
 
Standard Information Ratio Regression Equation: 
𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀_𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4
∗ 𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹01 + 𝛽𝛽7 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹02 + ⋯
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2017 Information Ratio Regression: 
𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀2017 =  −116,737 − 0.09 ∗ 𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀2016 − 0.01 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀_𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎2016 + 116,737.6
∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀2016 + 0 ∗ 𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎2016 + 0 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎2016
− 0.51 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹01 − 0.15 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹02 − 0.17 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹03 − 0.06 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹04 − 0.18
∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹05 − 0.24 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹06 − 0.60 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹07 − 0.30 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹08 − 0.40 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹09
− 0.55 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹10 − 0.39 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹11 − 0.20 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹12 − 0.15 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹13 − 0.49
∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹14 − 0.47 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹15 
 
2018 Information Ratio Regression: 
𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀2018 =  −111,941 − 0.13 ∗ 𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀2017 − 0.02 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀_𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎2017 + 111,941.6
∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀2017 + 0 ∗ 𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎2017 + 0 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎2017
+ 0.11 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹01 + 0.47 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹02 + 0.46 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹03 + 0.58 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹04 + 0.47
∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹05 + 0.40 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹06 + 0.03 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹07 + 0.32 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹08 + 0.23 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹09
+ 0.07 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹10 + 0.23 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹11 + 0.43 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹12 + 0.50 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹13 + 0.15
∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹14 + 0.16 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹15 + 0.62 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹16 
 
2019 Information Ratio Regression: 
𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀2019 =  169,143.5 − 0.13 ∗ 𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀2018 − 0.03 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀_𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎2018 − 169,143
∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀2018 + 0 ∗ 𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎2018 + 0 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎2018
− 0.24 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹01 + 0.13 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹02 + 0.10 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹03 + 0.22 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹04 + 0.12
∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹05 + 0.05 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹06 − 0.31 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹07 − 0.01 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹08 − 0.12 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹09
− 0.27 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹10 − 0.10 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹11 + 0.09 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹12 + 0.15 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹13 − 0.19
∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹14 − 0.18 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹15 + 0.28 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹16 − 0.33 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹17 
 
The above regression equations were constructed from Tables 13, 14, and 15, 
which summarize on the following pages the coefficients for each variable and their 
respective significance level. P>|t| values that are below 0.05 are significant at the 95% 
level. 
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Table 13: Information Ratio Panel Regression, 2017 
Variable Coefficient P>|t| 
infratio -0.09 0.00 
ln_assets -0.01 0.46 
assetproportion 116,737.6 0.86 
posreturns 0.00 0.56 
negreturns 0.00 0.96 
yr01 -0.51 0.00 
yr02 -0.15 0.07 
yr03 -0.17 0.03 
yr04 -0.06 0.41 
yr05 -0.18 0.01 
yr06 -0.24 0.00 
yr07 -0.60 0.00 
yr08 -0.30 0.00 
yr09 -0.40 0.00 
yr10 -0.55 0.00 
yr11 -0.39 0.00 
yr12 -0.20 0.00 
yr13 -0.15 0.01 
yr14 -0.49 0.00 
yr15 -0.47 0.00 
_cons -116,737 0.86 
 
Table 14: Information Ratio Panel Regression, 2018 
Variable Coefficient P>|t| 
infratio -0.13 0.00 
ln_assets -0.02 0.11 
assetproportion 111,941.6 0.86 
posreturns 0.00 0.77 
negreturns 0.00 0.94 
yr01 0.11 0.20 
yr02 0.47 0.00 
yr03 0.46 0.00 
yr04 0.58 0.00 
yr05 0.47 0.00 
yr06 0.40 0.00 
yr07 0.03 0.56 
yr08 0.32 0.00 
yr09 0.23 0.00 
yr10 0.07 0.18 
yr11 0.23 0.00 
yr12 0.43 0.00 
yr13 0.50 0.00 
yr14 0.15 0.00 
yr15 0.16 0.00 
yr16 0.62 0.00 
_cons -111,941 0.86 
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Table 15: Information Ratio Panel Regression, 2019 
Variable Coefficient P>|t| 
infratio -0.13 0.00 
ln_assets -0.03 0.04 
assetproportion -169,143 0.79 
posreturns 0.00 0.85 
negreturns 0.00 0.57 
yr01 -0.24 0.01 
yr02 0.13 0.13 
yr03 0.10 0.21 
yr04 0.22 0.00 
yr05 0.12 0.09 
yr06 0.05 0.46 
yr07 -0.31 0.00 
yr08 -0.01 0.93 
yr09 -0.12 0.08 
yr10 -0.27 0.00 
yr11 -0.10 0.07 
yr12 0.09 0.14 
yr13 0.15 0.01 
yr14 -0.19 0.00 
yr15 -0.18 0.00 
yr16 0.28 0.00 
yr17 -0.33 0.00 
_cons 169,143.5 0.79 
 
Studying the results from Tables 13-15, we found an interesting year effect. 
Looking at the year fixed effects (yr**), and studying the significance, the 2017 regression 
has most year effects as significant besides 2002 and 2004. Uniquely, the year effects are 
negative, and 2018 brings about a complete turn in fixed effects. The coefficients for 2008 
are wholly positive and significant except for 2001, 2007, and 2010. Comparing the 
coefficients – on these same years, particularly the turbulent 2001 and 2007, the coefficient 
contracted as well. 2019 had a similar flip, with a mix of coefficient signs and significance, 
though these signs and coefficients were definitely less consistent than the previous two 
predictions. This shift is expected, with the late-2018 correction resulting in a changing 
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With the above regression models, we arrived at the following predicted 
information ratio results by year. 
Table 16: Information Ratio Summary Statistics, by year 







2017 170 0.56 0.03 0.53 0.60 
2018 168 -0.12 0.12 -0.25 -0.01 
2019 156 0.31 0.08 0.23 0.41 
 
The above predicted information ratio results have some unique variability. The 
mean of the predicted information ratio for 2017 is higher than the other two years, and 
2018 had a negative information ratio forecast across the board. 2017 was a stable year in 
the post-financial crisis bull market, and thus this upwards trend likely pushed up 
information ratios estimates. 2018 market performance suffered from a correction in 
December that eliminated the gains from the year, and 2019 led the recovery from that 
correction to new highs. The accuracy of these returns, in terms of the second research 
question, is still uncertain. From a comparison to historical values, we noted that the 
regression model appeared to move extreme values closer to the mean across all three 
years. The variability seen in the actual fund information ratios is not present in the 
predicted information ratios, which was expected as extreme values are difficult to predict. 
As a note on the data – observations here declined significantly as the regression model 
dropped funds that lacked complete data on an asset basis, which was difficult to obtain. 
Still, our sample size, above 150 for all three years, is strong. 
 
Using the Treynor-Black Model 
With predicted information ratios, we will shift to generating the weights 
recommended by the Treynor-Black model. The active investment portion of the Treynor-
Black model is calculated as follows, using predicted fund information ratios:  
 




𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸� = 𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 
𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓 = 𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛ℎ𝑀𝑀 𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹 𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑑𝑑 𝑖𝑖 
P a g e  | 22 
The above calculation depends on an initial selection of a number of funds to invest 
in. The sum will be taken for the top information-ratio-ranked funds of the investable 
universe. Although an investor could invest across the entire universe of funds instead of 
picking the top x number of funds, it is simply not economical to diversify to such a degree. 
We ranked funds by their highest predicted information ratio, and incremented our fund 
selection by units of five, ranging from five funds up to 25 funds. The weighting system 
described above would theoretically place a larger weight of the portfolio into hedge fund 
managers with high potential for success, as indicated by the information ratio. 
 
Testing the Treynor-Black Model vs. a Naïve Model 
Given that we now have calculated forward information ratios, we can switch to 
the discussed Treynor-Black active weight model and generate a potential hedge fund 
investment portfolio. The performance of this portfolio based on the model weights versus 
naïve weights will indicate whether there is any return potentially available from the 
information ratio prediction and subsequent weighting system. 
For the construction of our long/short hedge fund trading portfolio, we used the 
Treynor-Black Model active weights as our long investment. The naïve model was created 
as an equal weight portfolio, with its formula below. Out of the same investments picked 
by a predicted information ratio ranking, the naïve model simply assigned each an equal 
percentage depending on the target number of holdings. Effectively speaking, the naïve 
model is simply where an investor puts in an equal amount of capital into each holding. 
The naïve model here is the short of the portfolio. 
 




𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = 𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀 𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 
𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓 = 𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛ℎ𝑀𝑀 𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹 𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑑𝑑 𝑖𝑖, 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 
 
With long Treynor-Black and short Naïve sets of weights, we then took the net 
weight against each other as the target long/short weight. If the weighting between funds 
does not matter, the portfolio would return effectively nothing out of sample, because we 
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are long and short in equal value. If the weighting does have an impact, the return will be 
different from zero – a higher return would indicate that the long leg (Treynor-Black) is 
generating excess return, and a negative return would indicate that the short leg (Naïve) is 
generating more return, and that the Treynor-Black model is not adding value. 
The out-of-sample test was conducted on 2017, 2018, and 2019, with example 
funds with holdings at 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25. Each of these was tested under two common 
portfolio management strategies: Buy and Hold, and Rebalance. As both of these strategies 
are tested, it’s important to note that both begin with the same defined weight from the 
Treynor-Black Model weights minus the Naïve Model weights. For the Buy and Hold 
strategy, weights were set at the beginning of the investment period and left untouched for 
a year. Funds with outperformance would therefore represent a higher proportion of the 
ending portfolio value, and funds that underperformed would grow smaller. However, this 
strategy is more exposed to a change in fortunes – a high performing fund taking losses 
would have greater weight in the middle of the period in this strategy, and so losses to the 
investment portfolio would be greater. The second strategy we tested was a Rebalance 
strategy, where the portfolio manager would return to the defined net weights at the end of 
every month. This would represent taking profits and buying more of your losers, and due 
to its strict adherence to the information ratio net weights, would best represent the efficacy 
of the Treynor-Black model as an allocation method. The rebalance strategy would be tied 
better to our net weights, with less exposure to the market. 
For each of the strategies and time-periods below, there is some brief discussion of 
trends, and there is a broader discussion at the end to compare the different models and 
their returns. Observations for all tests are at 12, because these tests were conducted on an 
annual basis. Each month represents one observation in the data. 
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Buy and Hold, 2017 















Market Return 1.00      
5-Fund Portfolio 0.19 1.00     
10-Fund Portfolio -0.02 0.15 1.00    
15-Fund Portfolio -0.29 -0.19 0.83 1.00   
20-Fund Portfolio -0.20 -0.11 0.92 0.92 1.00  
25-Fund Portfolio -0.20 -0.20 0.89 0.90 0.97 1.00 
 
Table 18: Buy and Hold T-Test Results, 2017 
T-Test Results Observations Mean* T-Value 
5-Fund Portfolio 12 0.00 0.21 
10-Fund Portfolio 12 0.04 5.60 
15-Fund Portfolio 12 0.03 3.04 
20-Fund Portfolio 12 0.03 2.96 
25-Fund Portfolio 12 0.02 2.81 
*reported in percentage points 
 
Table 19: Buy and Hold Statistical T-Test Results, 2017 
Statistical 
T-Test Results 
Ha: mean < 0 
Prob(T<t) 
Ha: mean !=  0 
Prob(T<t) 
Ha: mean > 0 
Prob(T<t) 
5-Fund Portfolio 0.58 0.84 0.42 
10-Fund Portfolio 0.99 0.02 0.00 
15-Fund Portfolio 0.99 0.01 0.01 
20-Fund Portfolio 0.99 0.01 0.01 
25-Fund Portfolio 0.99 0.02 0.01 
 
The 5-fund portfolio was correlated with the market, but adding more funds 
changed it to an inverse relationship with the market. The 10-fund portfolio, which is the 
closest to market-neutral per the correlation table, also had the highest mean monthly 
return. The mean return across the board appears to be economically insignificant, but 
statistically, all portfolios with greater than 5 holdings are significant at the 5% level. 
Therefore, for Funds>5, mean return is statistically expected to be different from zero, and 
with greater significance, mean return is expected to be larger than zero. 
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Rebalance, 2017 















Market Return 1.00      
5-Fund Portfolio 0.20 1.00     
10-Fund Portfolio 0.03 0.22 1.00    
15-Fund Portfolio -0.29 -0.08 0.79 1.00   
20-Fund Portfolio -0.20 -0.02 0.92 0.91 1.00  
25-Fund Portfolio 0.20 -0.10 0.88 0.90 0.97 1.00 
 
Table 21: Rebalance T-Test Results, 2017 
T-Test Results Observations Mean T-Value 
5-Fund Portfolio 12 0.00 0.12 
10-Fund Portfolio 12 0.04 5.52 
15-Fund Portfolio 12 0.03 2.91 
20-Fund Portfolio 12 0.03 2.67 
25-Fund Portfolio 12 0.02 2.56 
*reported in percentage points 
 
Table 22: Rebalance Statistical T-Test Results, 2017 
Statistical 
T-Test Results 
Ha: mean < 0 
Prob(T<t) 
Ha: mean !=  0 
Prob(T<t) 
Ha: mean > 0 
Prob(T<t) 
5-Fund Portfolio 0.55 0.91 0.45 
10-Fund Portfolio 0.99 0.00 0.00 
15-Fund Portfolio 0.99 0.01 0.01 
20-Fund Portfolio 0.99 0.02 0.01 
25-Fund Portfolio 0.99 0.03 0.01 
 
The rebalance portfolio for 2017 had some similar trends as seen in the buy and 
hold, except with two market-correlated funds. However, the 10-Fund portfolio is only 
market correlated by a slight margin, and is still the closest to market neutral of the 
portfolios. It also has the highest mean monthly return. Statistically speaking, for Funds>5, 
mean return is again expected to be significantly different, and greater than, zero. 
2017 Portfolio Strategy Comparison 
With 2017 being a standard bull-market year, the buy-and-hold strategy was likely 
to be more effective. It appears from the data that those top performers sustained their edge 
through the year and rebalancing back to the ‘losing’ funds detracted from potential return. 
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The mean monthly returns in both funds were positive, which tends to indicate that the 
Treynor-Black model has value to add. 
 
Buy and Hold, 2018 















Market Return 1.00      
5-Fund Portfolio -0.91 1.00     
10-Fund Portfolio -0.83 0.95 1.00    
15-Fund Portfolio -0.61 0.77 0.87 1.00   
20-Fund Portfolio -0.37 0.51 0.56 0.80 1.00  
25-Fund Portfolio -0.26 0.28 0.33 0.66 0.90 1.00 
 
Table 24: Buy and Hold T-Test Results, 2018 
T-Test Results Observations Mean T-Value 
5-Fund Portfolio 12 0.28 0.50 
10-Fund Portfolio 12 0.61 0.93 
15-Fund Portfolio 12 0.28 0.71 
20-Fund Portfolio 12 0.97 2.08 
25-Fund Portfolio 12 0.46 0.77 
*reported in percentage points 
 
Table 25: Buy and Hold Statistical T-Test Results, 2018 
Statistical 
T-Test Results 
Ha: mean < 0 
Prob(T<t) 
Ha: mean !=  0 
Prob(T<t) 
Ha: mean > 0 
Prob(T<t) 
5-Fund Portfolio 0.69 0.63 0.31 
10-Fund Portfolio 0.81 0.37 0.19 
15-Fund Portfolio 0.75 0.49 0.25 
20-Fund Portfolio 0.97 0.06 0.03 
25-Fund Portfolio 0.77 0.46 0.23 
 
In the 2018 buy and hold model, all portfolios are inversely correlated with the 
market, but as the fund number rises, the correlation trends down towards zero. This 
indicates that the funds, as we move lower in the information ratio ranking, are taking on 
more market exposure, and that the positive mean monthly return in the low-fund-count 
portfolios was derived from an effectively short-market position. As more positions are 
added, logically speaking, this would reduce significant market directional exposure and 
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tend towards neutral or slightly positive, as seen in the data. The only results that are 
statistically significant in this model are for the 20-fund portfolio at the 95% level, where 
the mean monthly return is expected to be greater than zero. The 20-fund portfolio also has 
the highest mean monthly return out of the set of funds above. 
 
Rebalance, 2018 















Market Return 1.00      
5-Fund Portfolio -0.91 1.00     
10-Fund Portfolio -0.84 0.93 1.00    
15-Fund Portfolio -0.67 0.83 0.93 1.00   
20-Fund Portfolio -0.43 0.61 0.62 0.77 1.00  
25-Fund Portfolio -0.46 0.56 0.59 0.75 0.95 1.00 
 
Table 27: Rebalance T-Test Results, 2018 
T-Test Results Observations Mean T-Value 
5-Fund Portfolio 12 0.21 0.45 
10-Fund Portfolio 12 0.59 0.95 
15-Fund Portfolio 12 0.38 0.88 
20-Fund Portfolio 12 1.22 2.32 
25-Fund Portfolio 12 0.91 1.39 
*reported in percentage points 
 
Table 28: Rebalance Statistical T-Test Results, 2018 
Statistical 
T-Test Results 
Ha: mean < 0 
Prob(T<t) 
Ha: mean !=  0 
Prob(T<t) 
Ha: mean > 0 
Prob(T<t) 
5-Fund Portfolio 0.67 0.66 0.33 
10-Fund Portfolio 0.82 0.36 0.18 
15-Fund Portfolio 0.80 0.40 0.20 
20-Fund Portfolio 0.98 0.04 0.02 
25-Fund Portfolio 0.90 0.19 0.10 
 
In the 2018 rebalance portfolio, we see similar correlation trends as earlier, though 
the correlation across the board does seem to be slightly more market inverse with a 
rebalancing portfolio. Though the difference is too small to draw conclusions from at a 
lower number of funds, it appears that the 25-fund portfolio is more market inverse when 
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rebalanced. Considering the structure of our long/short portfolio, this actually means that 
the lowest-ranked (by information ratio) funds in the 2018 rebalance portfolio were long 
the market, and the short position taken for bottom-ranked funds increased the market-
inverse exposure. The T-test for this portfolio was uniformly insignificant, besides the 20-
fund portfolio at the 95% level. As the T-test is comparing whether returns significantly 
differ from zero, it is appropriate that the 20-fund portfolio also has the highest mean 
monthly return. 
2018 Portfolio Strategy Comparison 
2018, for the first 11months, was similar to 2017 in terms of performance. 
However, in December 2018, there was a large market correction that decimated market 
index returns to end the year negative. Comparing the 25-fund portfolio market correlation, 
this indicates the funds that were long on the market but added last to the portfolio and 
shorted, suffered in weighting throughout the year with buy-and-hold. With reduced 
weights, they were unable to contribute alpha when the net-short-market position became 
useful in December. The rebalancing method, however, reallocated capital at the start of 
the month, and improved the market-inverse position as we saw in the correlation table. 
We expected that this market move would have unique results with our regression 
model, and it looks like our statistical significance was adversely impacted. For the 
regression model, it is interesting to see how performance will be in 2019, immediately 
following the market correction. We expected model accuracy to decline for 2019, in both 
strategies. 
 
Buy and Hold, 2019 















Market Return 1.00      
5-Fund Portfolio -0.69 1.00     
10-Fund Portfolio -0.66 0.99 1.00    
15-Fund Portfolio -0.75 0.99 0.99 1.00   
20-Fund Portfolio -0.76 0.99 0.97 0.99 1.00  
25-Fund Portfolio -0.77 0.98 0.97 0.98 1.00 1.00 
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Table 30: Buy and Hold T-Test Results, 2019 
T-Test Results Observations Mean T-Value 
5-Fund Portfolio 12 -0.13 -0.36 
10-Fund Portfolio 12 -0.06 -0.26 
15-Fund Portfolio 12 -0.19 -0.70 
20-Fund Portfolio 12 -0.12 -0.54 
25-Fund Portfolio 12 -0.08 -0.43 
*reported in percentage points 
 
Table 31: Buy and Hold Statistical T-Test Results, 2019 
Statistical 
T-Test Results 
Ha: mean < 0 
Prob(T<t) 
Ha: mean !=  0 
Prob(T<t) 
Ha: mean > 0 
Prob(T<t) 
5-Fund Portfolio 0.36 0.73 0.64 
10-Fund Portfolio 0.40 0.80 0.60 
15-Fund Portfolio 0.25 0.50 0.75 
20-Fund Portfolio 0.30 0.60 0.70 
25-Fund Portfolio 0.34 0.68 0.66 
 
The 2019 buy-and-hold portfolio deviated significantly from the previous models. 
First, it actually still had a market inverse correlation, but the inter-portfolio correlation 
was higher by a large margin. The 5-fund portfolio had a correlation of 0.9778 with the 25-
fund portfolio, indicating strongly that the top-25 information ratio-ranked funds all had 
similar performance during the year. This is especially shown when analyzing the lack of 
statistical significance. All portfolios were not statistically different from zero, and the 
mean monthly return actually indicated a negative average return. Economically and 
statistically, this negative return is effectively zero, and the similar performance of all funds 
over the year shown by correlation reduces the potential results we could draw from the 
data. 
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Rebalance, 2019 















Market Return 1.00      
5-Fund Portfolio -0.71 1.00     
10-Fund Portfolio -0.69 1.00 1.00    
15-Fund Portfolio -0.75 1.00 0.99 1.00   
20-Fund Portfolio -0.76 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00  
25-Fund Portfolio -0.77 0.99 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 
 
Table 33: Rebalance T-Test Results, 2019 
T-Test Results Observations Mean T-Value 
5-Fund Portfolio 12 0.00 0.01 
10-Fund Portfolio 12 0.02 0.08 
15-Fund Portfolio 12 -0.08 -0.27 
20-Fund Portfolio 12 -0.04 -0.17 
25-Fund Portfolio 12 -0.02 -0.11 
*reported in percentage points 
 
Table 34: Rebalance Statistical T-Test Results, 2019 
Statistical 
T-Test Results 
Ha: mean < 0 
Prob(T<t) 
Ha: mean !=  0 
Prob(T<t) 
Ha: mean > 0 
Prob(T<t) 
5-Fund Portfolio 0.50 0.99 0.50 
10-Fund Portfolio 0.53 0.94 0.47 
15-Fund Portfolio 0.40 0.79 0.60 
20-Fund Portfolio 0.44 0.87 0.56 
25-Fund Portfolio 0.46 0.92 0.54 
 
The 2019 rebalance portfolio was fundamentally similar to the buy-and-hold 
strategy over the same period, with market-inverse correlations but strong inter-fund 
correlations. Again, none of the portfolio returns were statistically different from zero in 
either direction. The mean return for the 5- and 10-fund portfolio flipped signs, tending 
slightly positive. 
2019 Portfolio Strategy Comparison 
Comparing the two 2019 portfolios, we see similar performance and the predicted 
inaccuracy derived from 2018 data. The December drawdown appears to have significantly 
altered the Treynor-Black recommended weights on this different set of funds, as the top-
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performers from 2018 were likely short the market as the year ended and 2019 began. With 
2019 being a strong continuation of the broad bull market, these funds were unprepared to 
perform, and the model was likely therefore inaccurate. 
 
Treynor-Black Long/Short Model Results 
The Treynor-Black vs. Naïve long/short strategy was tested under three major 
market conditions. In 2017, we tested a trending bull market after years of upwards 
movement. 2018 extended the same trend up until December, where there was a significant 
market correction leading to the market ending down for the year. 2019 acted as a return 
to the mean of the past few years, with the market recovering in impressive fashion from 
the correction and setting record highs. This unique order of events allows us to draw 
conclusions about our model’s efficacy in differing market environments. 
From the above major market periods, we see that the model is effective in upwards 
trending markets (2017), where the last year had strong returns. In a market drawdown 
(2018) during an upwards trending market, the model is still effective, but less so. Its 
statistical significance and magnitude of returns are greatly reduced to effectively zero. 
Following a market drawdown, as financial markets recover and again trend up (2019), the 
portfolio is ineffective. The adverse impact of the previous year’s drawdown results in a 
position with negative return, and there is no statistical significance to speak of. In the end, 
however, the Treynor-Black active portfolio method weighting is an effective way to 
allocate capital. Although it appears to take two consecutive years to adapt to a market 
shift, the long/short method used in our research provides effective low return in up 
markets, combined with minimal downside risk as seen in 2018. Even in a market 
drawdown or after with a mis-specified model (2019), long/short strategy returns did not 
deviate significantly from zero. 
The fact that fund return was so inversely correlated with the market was surprising. 
Given that we were testing a long/short portfolio, we thought that there would be more 
market exposure, or at least market neutrality with the level of diversification in the funds 
themselves and the fund-of-funds portfolio. As mentioned by Fung and Hsieh (2021) in the 
literature review, long/short funds are generally factor- and market-independent, yet this 
set of funds had significant market inverse correlation in generating return. 
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Conclusion 
The Treynor-Black model over 2017, 2018, and 2019, proved to be effective in a 
trending-up market, safe in a volatile correction, and poor in a market recovery. These 
results could potentially be driven from two major factors. In generating this model, we 
began with forecasting information ratios on a factor basis. Then, we conducted a Treynor-
Black weight model on those results. Speculating on this, our performance results in 2017 
and 2018 could be drawn from either strong information ratio predictions that allowed the 
Treynor-Black model to outperform, or from the efficacy of the model itself in correcting 
for risk and maximizing return. 
The trading strategy between Treynor-Black and the Naïve model has strong returns 
in 2017. However, this strategy is economically neutral for several reasons. First, hedge 
funds charge high fees that this simplified model did not account for. Second, hedge funds 
in the optimal portfolio (2017, rebalance) generally do not allow for rapid investment and 
divestment on a monthly basis. Combined with general transactional and management 
costs, along with taxes, the Treynor-Black and Naïve model together are not very effective. 
One thing to note with this long/short model is that return was reported on a monthly basis. 
Therefore, the return percentages in the T-Test tables above, when annualized, have low 
but stable return in 2017. Under specific conditions, the combined model can generate 
alpha for a fund-of-funds, though this paper can only speculate on this, as we have not 
incorporated or tested the real costs such a strategy would face. 
However, the Treynor-Black model has proven to have strong returns 
independently, beyond the Naïve model. Therefore, based on this research, utilizing the 
Treynor-Black model and information ratio predictions to make fund-of-fund investment 
decisions will likely offer returns above an equal-allocation portfolio without significantly 
altering the risk of the portfolio. 
From an information ratio/appraisal ratio side, this research points to the 
importance of the information ratio in making hedge fund investment decisions. 
Individuals or institutions making investing decisions, or considering a set of hedge funds, 
should look at the information ratio and consider its implications before allocating capital. 
A high information ratio may not persist, and a fund with strong performance may not 
continue. 
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Looking forward to other potential research, an analysis of this data with more 
complete data, on underlying assets under management or fund flows, could significantly 
improve regression results. The model could also be extended to the turbulent 2020 markets 
once sufficient fund data is reported, allowing for a test of the Treynor-Black model in a 
market with a more sustained downturn.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Variable Summary 
Variable Name Variable Description 
monthlynetassets Reports assets of underlying funds on a monthly basis in USD 
secid Security ID, acts as an identifier for each hedge fund 
year Year identifier 
month Month identifier 
yearlyret Yearly return by hedge fund in percentage point form 
monthlyret Monthly return by hedge fund in percentage point form 
stdev Standard deviation of the predicted information ratios 
variance Standard deviation of information ratios, squared 
average_assets Average hedge fund net assets (yearly average of monthlynetassets) 
ln_avgassets Natural log of average_assets 
assets Hedge fund net assets in Q4 of every year (drawn from monthlynetassets) 
ln_assets Natural log of assets 
avgmanagertenure Average hedge fund manager tenure at the fund 
ln_avgtenure Natural log of avgmanagertenure 
longestmanagertenure Longest hedge fund manager tenure at the fund 
ln_longesttenure Natural log of longesttenure 
mgmtfee Hedge fund money management fees charged to investors 
performancefee Hedge fund variable (performance-based) fees charged to investors 
highwatermark 
A hedge fund fee restriction wherein the fund only pays the 
hedge fund manager if the hedge fund meets or exceeds its 
previous peak net asset value 
clawback Paid out money or benefits can be withdrawn by the firm from managers 
deferredload Sales commissions that are paid when investors withdraw capital from the hedge fund 
feesbool A generated binary variable that returns 1 if management fees or performance funds are below the standard 2/20 rate 
feesrange 
A generated binary variable that returns 1 if management fees 
or performance funds are outside of a 12.5% range of the 
standard 2/20 rate 
feesaltstruc 
A generated binary variable that returns 1 if any of the three 
atypical hedge fund fee and payment structures are present 
(highwatermark, clawback, deferredload) 
posreturns A generated variable that captures yearly hedge fund returns only if they are positive 
negreturns A generated variable that captures yearly hedge fund returns only if they are negative 
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Appendix 1, continued: Variable Summary 
Variable Name Variable Description 
firmassets A generated variable that represents the monthly parent firm assets (created by a sum by firm of monthlynetassets) 
assetproportion 
A generated variable that represents the proportion of parent 
firm assets that a hedge fund controls (created by dividing 
monthlynetassets by firmassets) 
ln_firmassets Natural log of firmassets 
fundcount A generated variable that counts the number of hedge funds in the sample that are under a single firm 
yr** A generated binary variable that returns 1 for the year (labeled ** on the left, created for all years in sample) 
infratio A calculated variable that contains the information ratios by year and fund 
predinfratio 
A predicted variable that relies on part of our regression 
analysis, predicting the next years’ information ratio (in the 
data, this value is shifted such that the predicted information 
ratio for a year aligns with the year itself, rather than the year 
before) 
weights 
Treynor-Black model weights by fund, calculated according to 
the active portfolio method. These are calculated for the three 
years tested (2017, 2018, 2019) 
naiveweights 
Weights by fund, calculated on a simple percentage basis that 
depends solely on the number of hedge funds to be invested in. 
These are calculated for the three years tested (2017, 2018, 
2019) 
netweights A net weight position calculated by a long investment in weights and a short of naiveweights 
portfolioreturn A calculated return per month, created by multiplying monthlyret and netweights 
marketreturn S&P 500 monthly return for the three years tested (2017, 2018, 2019) 
 
